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ABSTRACT  
The contemporary patent marketplace is a complex ecosystem 
comprised of innovators and manufacturers who are often 
connected by a varied group of intermediaries. While there are a 
variety of intermediary business models—such as patent assertion 
entities and defensive aggregators—each facilitates a variant of a 
similar licensing transaction, connecting a set of patents held by a 
patent owner with a product or service offered by a prospective 
licensee. One explanation for the prevalence of intermediaries is 
that they engage in practices tantamount to arbitrage, acquiring 
patents and then licensing them at a profit because they enjoy 
greater success in patent litigation than patent holders would on 
their own. This paper advances an additional explanation: some 
intermediaries may serve a function analogous to a platform 
trading in non-exclusive licenses, overcoming search and valuation 
costs to facilitate licensing. 
This paper focuses on the use of two contract terms in 
intermediaries’ dealings with technology market participants: 
revenue sharing in patent acquisition and non-exclusive licensing. 
The Federal Trade Commission’s Patent Entity Activity Study 
reported that intermediaries used both of these terms. Building on 
those findings, this paper argues that intermediaries that use both 
provisions may, under some conditions, operate in a manner 
analogous to a two-sided platform. First, this paper examines how 
participants in a technology market would value non-exclusive 
licenses granted ex post, after the licensed product is already on 
the market. The paper argues that—in addition to the avoidance of 
litigation costs— the reduction of uncertainty can also drive 
licensee demand. Next, the paper proposes that use of revenue 
sharing allows patent holders to experience network effects from 
the number of prospective licensees accessed through the 
intermediary, which may make the intermediary more attractive 
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than licensing unilaterally. Finally, this paper argues that the 
conduct of a patent licensing intermediary using these contract 
features can be analogized to the practices of other licensing 
intermediaries such as performing rights organizations and patent 
pools. These observations suggest that one explanation for the 
success of some intermediary models—as well as one aspect of 
their conduct that may influence competition in technology 
markets—is their ability to connect patent holders and prospective 
licensees with a greater number of potential trading partners than 
they would otherwise be able to connect with on their own. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Patent rights offer inventors the possibility of a financial return on 
their investments in innovation. Some inventors commercialize their 
patented inventions themselves, taking advantage of their right to exclude to 
enjoy marketplace advantages over their rivals. As an alternative, many 
other patent owners attempt to monetize their patents through trade in 
technology markets, using a variety of transactions ranging from licensing 
to outright patent sales.1 Patent owners can also have different approaches 
to licensing, spanning from partnering with manufacturers practicing open 
innovation to commercialize their inventions to enforcing patents to collect 
royalties years after products have entered the marketplace.2  
 In many instances, private intermediaries have arisen to facilitate 
patent licensing transactions. These intermediaries have taken a variety of 
forms. For example, the FTC’s report on the Evolving IP Marketplace 
(“2011 Report”) describes a number of “evolving patent assertion business 
models.”3 These include “patent enforcement and licensing companies” that 
acquire patent rights from patent holders and license them to prospective 
licensees.4 The 2011 Report also describes “defensive buying funds,” or 
defensive aggregators, who are engaged by manufacturers and other 
                                                     
1 See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING 
PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 31–72 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 
FTC REPORT]; Edith Ramirez & Lisa Kimmel, A Competition Policy Perspective 
on Patent Law: The Federal Trade Commission’s Report on the Evolving IP 
Marketplace, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Aug. 2011, at 2–4. 
2 2011 FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 31–72. 
3 Id. at 62–63. Professors Andrei Hagiu and David Yoffie also describe a number of 
different intermediary models. See generally Andrei Hagiu & David B. Yoffie, The 
New Patent Intermediaries: Platforms, Defensive Aggregators, and Super-
Aggregators, 27 J. ECON. PERSPS., no. 1, 2013, at 45.  
4 See 2011 FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 60. 
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prospective licensees to acquire licenses from patent holders.5  The report 
also notes “patent aggregators” that license patent portfolios assembled 
from multiple patent holders and that often also partner with investors who 
acquire both an interest in future royalties as well as a license to the 
portfolios.6  
 There are a variety of perspectives on the impact that these 
intermediaries have on technology markets. Some commentators take the 
view that these intermediaries may facilitate liquidity in technology 
markets, supporting the incentive function of patents by allowing patent 
holders to obtain royalties from prospective licensees.7 Other commentators 
take the opposite view, arguing that these intermediaries capitalize upon—
rather than mitigate—failures in technology markets, engaging in rent-
seeking behavior at the expense of prospective licensees.8 
 One explanation for the presence of intermediaries is that they 
enjoy advantages in patent litigation and are thus able to enjoy a bargaining 
position in licensing negotiations superior to that which patent holders 
could achieve on their own.9 Because they are not operating companies, 
intermediaries may bear lower discovery costs and experience fewer 
business disruptions due to litigation than the firms from which they acquire 
patent rights.10 Similarly, intermediaries would not suffer reputational 
harms from being seen as an aggressive litigant and would not be subject to 
countersuit.11 As a result, they could engage in a form of arbitrage, 
acquiring patents and then licensing them for royalties greater than their 
prior owner could obtain.12 
A. Intermediaries as Licensing Platforms 
 While litigation advantages may account for the success of some 
intermediaries, another possibility is that the intermediaries provide a 
benefit by helping parties consummate licenses. While these intermediaries 
may litigate, their success is based on the value of the licenses they 
facilitate. Intermediaries may help patent owners and prospective licensees 
                                                     
5 See id. at 66; Hagiu and Yoffie, supra note 3, at 56 (describing “defensive 
aggregators”). 
6 See 2011 FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 65; Hagiu and Yoffie, supra note 3, at 58 
(describing “super-aggregators”). 
7 2011 FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 69 n.98. 
8 See id. at 53, 71. 
9 See Erica S. Mintzer & Suzanne Munck, The Joint U.S. Department of Justice and 
Federal Trade Commission Workshop on Patent Assertion Entity Activities—
“Follow the Money”, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 423, 426 (2014). 
10 See id. 
11 See id. 
12 See Hagiu & Yoffie, supra note 3, at 52. 
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find each other. They may also help the parties agree on the value of a 
license. Both of these tasks often pose challenges for parties attempting to 
license patents on their own.  
 Patent licensing transactions are frustrated by several challenges. 
Patents often have unclear scope because the boundaries of the protected 
content are defined by written claims that are inherently subject to the 
imprecise nature of language.13 Patents have uncertain validity because they 
can be invalidated by any literature in the prior art—including literature that 
was not appreciated by the Patent Office when it granted the patent.14 
Patents licenses are very difficult to value; as novel and unique property, 
patents lack comparables.15 In addition, firms looking to consummate 
licensing transactions face high search costs because patent owners have a 
difficult time finding prospective licensees using their claimed technology 
and prospective licensees have a difficult time identifying patents relevant 
to their products.16 These sources of uncertainty compound another issue 
common to all technology development: the commercial success of an 
invention is not known before commercialization actually takes place.17  
 Intermediaries may play a role in overcoming these obstacles. In 
many other markets, intermediaries have arisen to facilitate transactions that 
would otherwise be frustrated by market inefficiency.18  The economic 
analysis of two-sided platforms suggests that such platforms may be 
successful when the customers that they connect experience network effects 
from the possibility of trading with one another.19 Both patent holders and 
prospective licensees may experience such effects because patent holders 
value access to a broad royalty base while licensees value broad freedom to 
operate. This may explain why some patent holders trade through 
intermediaries, as opposed to licensing their patents themselves. For 
example, a patent holder may value trade with a patent assertion entity with 
the industry knowledge needed to find a diverse set of prospective licensees, 
just as a manufacturer may value trade with a defensive aggregator who has 
the market understanding needed to identify and engage with holders of 
patents relevant to the manufacturer’s products.  
                                                     
13 See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSPS., 
no. 2, 2005, at 75, 76. 
14 See id. at 77. 
15 Hagiu & Yoffie, supra note 3, at 46–47; see also 2011 FTC REPORT, supra note 
1, at 57–58 (noting patent remedies as a motivating factor for ex post licensing 
transactions). 
16 E.g., 2011 FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 54–57; Hagiu & Yoffie, supra note 3, at 
47.  
17 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 13, at 81. 
18 See Hagiu & Yoffie, supra note 3, at 45.  
19 See infra Part III.A. 
No. 1] DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 273 
 
 Not all patent intermediaries operate as two-sided platforms. Some 
intermediaries may capitalize upon the costs of litigation, filing suit solely 
to collect a litigation-avoidance settlement.20 Intermediaries that do this may 
also have an incentive to engage with as many prospective licensees as 
possible. Unlike the case of an intermediary that operates as a two-sided 
platform, however, this incentive is not a result of network effects 
experienced by its customers. Instead, it is simply a result of the fact that 
maximizing the number of lawsuits filed will increase the number of 
litigation-avoidance settlements that can be collected. Asserting patents to 
obtain litigation-avoidance settlements capitalizes upon the willingness of 
defendants to avoid litigation.21 By capturing this willingness in settlement 
payments, intermediaries may obtain royalties that exceed the value that 
prospective licensees would place on licenses to their patents.22 In contrast, 
an intermediary that operates as a platform would facilitate the negotiation 
of a royalty that would reflect the value that both a patent holder and a 
prospective licensee would attach to a license.  
 Despite their differences, many intermediaries facilitate similar 
licensing transactions. For example, patent enforcement and licensing 
companies appear optimized to obtain the highest payment to patent 
holders, while defensive aggregators appear optimized to secure the 
cheapest licenses for prospective licensees.23  Nevertheless, they all have 
one feature in common: they bridge the gap between patent holders and 
prospective licensees. At the core of their transactions is a group of patents 
held by the former that likely read upon a product or service offered by the 
latter. When such a pairing of patent and product exists, the patent holder 
possesses a legal entitlement against the prospective licensee’s 
infringement.24 A license agreement removes this entitlement.25  Both 
parties can benefit from a license: the patent holder obtains a royalty 
payment and the prospective licensee obtains a release from further 
liability.26 This is irrespective of whether the license is facilitated by an 
intermediary that is an agent of the patent seller or the prospective licensee. 
                                                     
20 See infra Part III.D. 
21 See Hagiu & Yoffie, supra note 3, at 53. 
22 See id. 
23 See 2011 FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 60–66. 
24 The patent law grants inventors legal rights in their inventions. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 
271, 281 (2012). Under the framework laid out by Judge Guido Calabresi and 
Douglas Melamed, these rights operate as an entitlement not to be infringed that is 
protected by either a property or liability rule, depending on the availability of 
injunctive relief. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 
1089, 1090–92 (1972). 
25 Id. at 1092. 
26 See infra Part II.A. 
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Intermediaries that operate as platforms may allow both parties to enjoy 
these benefits. 
B. Overview of This Paper  
 This paper focuses on intermediaries that facilitate ex post 
licensing. It proposes that one advantage some patent intermediaries may 
offer relative to licensing through bilateral negotiation is the ability to 
connect multiple patent owners and prospective licensees with one another. 
As discussed in the remainder of this section, several practices observed in 
the Federal Trade Commission’s recent Report on its Patent Assertion 
Entity Study (the “2016 Report”) are consistent with this licensing 
function.27 For example, the Report notes that the entities almost always 
traded in non-exclusive licenses made ex post, without technology transfer. 
The 2016 Report also notes the frequent use of revenue sharing agreements 
between patent assertion entities and the patent holders from which they 
acquired their patents. 
 Part II of this paper examines how participants in a technology 
market would value non-exclusive ex post licenses such as those observed 
in the 2016 Report. It proposes that such licenses represent an agreement to 
extinguish the patent holder’s entitlement against infringement in 
consideration of a royalty paid by the prospective licensee. Negotiating in 
the shadow of court-ordered remedies, parties negotiate a payment that 
reflects the probability of validity and infringement, the expected court-
awarded reasonable royalty award, and the avoidance of litigation costs.28 
While the desire to avoid litigation costs could drive licensee demand in 
many cases, so too could the desire to resolve uncertainty regarding 
potential liability. 
 Part III addresses how patent intermediaries can serve as platforms 
connecting patent holders with prospective licensees. It proposes that the 
use of revenue sharing allows patent holders to experience network effects 
from the number of prospective licensees accessed through the 
intermediary. A patent holder trading with an intermediary granting non-
exclusive licenses would value its ability to grant as many licenses as 
possible: doing so would increase its royalty base while not diminishing the 
value of any granted license. Conversely, a prospective licensee would 
value an intermediary providing licenses to as many patents as possible; 
provided that the patents were relevant to its products, doing so would 
                                                     
27 Fed. Trade Comm’n, Patent Assertion Entity Activity: An FTC Study (2016) 
[hereinafter 2016 FTC Report]. 
28 See 2011 FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 138 (“Patent remedies also play a central 
role in ex post patent transactions by establishing the legal shadow in which 
negotiations occur.”). 
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increase its freedom to operate. As a result, both parties would value being 
able to transact with as many opposite parties as possible, yielding indirect 
network effects upon which intermediaries may be able to capitalize. 
 Finally, Part IV observes that the conduct of some patent 
intermediaries using revenue sharing and non-exclusive licensing can be 
analogized to the practices of other of licensing intermediaries such as 
performing rights organizations and patent pools. Each licenses rights on 
behalf of multiple rights holders, granting licenses to many users and 
distributing resulting royalties back to the rights holders. Considering the 
existing analysis of intermediaries on technology market competition, this 
section also proposes that patent licensing intermediaries may influence 
competition between patent holders who would have otherwise competed as 
rival licensors had they not licensed their patents through common 
intermediaries. 
C. Findings in the Federal Trade Commission’s Patent Assertion 
Entity Study 
 The Federal Trade Commission’s 2016 Report contributes to the 
understanding of intermediary practices. The report describes the inner 
workings of twenty-two firms that operated as patent assertion entities, 
which it defined as “businesses that acquire patents from third parties and 
seek to generate revenue by asserting them against alleged infringers.”29 A 
key finding of the 2016 Report is that the twenty-two firms studied used 
only two different business models: a Portfolio model focused on 
negotiating licenses to relatively large patent portfolios in consideration or 
relatively large royalties and a Litigation model focused on entering into a 
relatively large number of low-value licenses  made to settle litigation.30  
Firms using the Portfolio model licensed large patent portfolios, “often 
containing hundreds or thousands of patents” and with royalties “typically 
in the millions of dollars.”31  Firms using the Litigation model “typically 
sued potential licenses,” and then entered into license agreements “covering 
small portfolios.”32 The 2016 Report finds that, “given the relatively low 
dollar amount of the licenses, the behavior of Litigation PAEs [Patent 
Assertion Entities] is consistent with nuisance litigation.”33 
 In addition to its key findings, the 2016 Report provides a breadth 
of detail into how the twenty-two firms performed their intermediary 
                                                     
29  See 2016 FTC REPORT, supra note 27, at 1. The report describes conduct taking 
place between 2009 and 2014. Id. at 3. 
30 Id. 
31 Id.  
32 Id. at 4. 
33 Id.  
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function and even describes the patent acquisition agreements they entered 
into with patent holders34 and the terms used in their licenses.35 Beyond the 
twenty-two studied firms, these findings shed light on the nature of market 
demand for intermediary services more generally: they provide examples of 
the arrangements that both patent holders and prospective licensees agreed 
to consummate with the intermediaries.  
 The 2016 Report found that patents related to information and 
communication technologies played a prominent role in the activities of the 
firms studied.36 Information and communication technologies are 
recognized to be a technically complex field and a crowded field of art.37  
Products in these fields may comprise numerous components, often 
manufactured by independent firms.38 Such complex products may infringe 
hundreds, if not thousands of patents.39 As a result, manufacturers of such 
products often face uncertainty regarding the extent of their patent 
infringement liability to third parties. This may present an opportunity for 
intermediaries to identify relevant patents and facilitate the negotiation of 
licenses that grant manufacturers desired certainty regarding their freedom 
to operate. On the other hand, however, such uncertainty may also present 
patent holders with a pathway for opportunistic conduct. 
 The 2016 Report also notes the frequent grant of non-exclusive 
licenses by intermediaries.40 This is significant because the right to exclude 
is a central component of the patent grant. In contrast to non-exclusive 
licenses, an exclusive license confers the licensee with standing to enforce 
                                                     
34 See id. at 48–49 (describing “the use of revenue sharing in . . . patent acquisition 
agreements” by Litigation PAEs). 
35 Id. at 85–88 (describing “License Term Characteristics”). 
36 The report explains that 88 percent of the patents held by the firms fell into the 
“Computer & Communications” and “Other Electrical & Electronic” categories 
used by the National Bureau of Economic Research in its patent citation data, 
which are based upon the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office patent classification 
system. Id. at 124 (“For all patents reported in the FTC’s study: Eighty-eight 
percent related to the Computers & Communications or Other Electrical & 
Electronic patent technology categories.”); id. at 128–29 (describing methodology); 
Bronwyn H. Hall, Adam B. Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, The NBER Patent 
Citations Data File: Lessons, Insights and Methodological Tools 12–13 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8498, 2001) (describing 
categorization methodology). 
37 2011 FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 90. 
38 Id. 
39 See id. at 163 (“IT products, such as personal computers and cell phones, are 
covered by thousands of patents.”).  
40 See 2016 FTC REPORT, supra note 27, at 85 (“Reported data did not indicate that 
Study PAEs granted exclusive licenses to their patents; instead, Study PAE licenses 
generally granted non-exclusive rights.”). 
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the patents to exclude rivals from the market for products embodying the 
licensed patents. This exclusivity offers value to a prospective licensee 
through the potential of enhancing its returns in relevant product markets. A 
non-exclusive license offers the licensee no such benefits. 
 The use of non-exclusive licensing is even more significant when 
coupled with ex post licensing. Building upon the FTC’s prior research, the 
2016 Report notes that patent assertion entities are understood to engage in 
ex post licensing—that is, licensing that takes place after the prospective 
licensee has already developed and offered its product for sale.41 Because 
such licensing takes place after the licensed product is already on the 
market, it involves no technology transfer.42  This is in contrast to ex ante 
licensing, which takes place before commercialization using license 
agreements often containing additional terms providing for the exchange of 
know-how or other trade secrets.43  Access to such technology transfer is 
one component of value that an ex ante license confers that an ex post 
license lacks. 
 A non-exclusive ex post license provides the licensee with neither 
technology transfer nor marketplace exclusivity. As a result, such licenses 
confer only one form of value: the value of being released from the patent 
owner’s claim of infringement.44 This raises the question of whether 
prospective licensees attach any value to such a release beyond the 
avoidance of patent infringement litigation. On the one hand, the 2016 
Report indicates that the Litigation model almost always filed litigation 
prior to consummating a license agreement and concludes that the model 
frequently obtained low value settlements, suggesting licensing motivated 
                                                     
41 See id. at 1 (“In acquiring and then asserting patents, PAEs target individuals and 
businesses that already use (at least allegedly) the patented technology. PAE 
activity therefore results in what often are referred to as ex post patent transactions 
because any patent license or settlement occurs after someone has developed or 
marketed the product at issue.”). Ex post licensing transactions take place after the 
licensed product has already been developed or commercialized. See 2011 FTC 
REPORT, supra note 1, at 50 (“In many cases, the licensee or purchaser already uses 
the patented technology when approached by the patent owner. What it lacks is a 
patent license to use the technology. These patent transactions occur ex post, after a 
firm has invested in creating, developing or commercializing the patented 
technology. It needs the ex post license to avoid liability even if it invented the 
technology independent of the patentee because patent infringement is a strict 
liability offense.”). 
42 2011 FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 52–53. 
43 Id. at 33.  
44 See id. at 52 (“A manufacturer’s royalty payment . . . obtains only the avoidance 
of infringement litigation, not the benefit of the technology itself.”).  
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by litigation avoidance.45 On the other hand, the 2016 Report indicates that 
the Portfolio model frequently negotiated licenses independent of litigation, 
suggesting an alternative basis for licensee demand.46 Similarly, the 2011 
Report notes that defensive aggregators are recognized to proactively seek 
out licenses on behalf of manufacturing firms, which also suggests that 
there is demand among such firms for non-exclusive ex post licenses.47   
 In addition, the 2016 Report notes the frequent use of revenue 
sharing agreements between firms using the Litigation model and patent 
holders. In contrast to the observations of the 2016 Report, prior literature 
frequently described patent assertion entities as acquiring patents outright 
and asserting them independently from the patent holder.48 The 2016 Report 
describes intermediaries that, instead of paying the patent holder a fixed 
sum to acquire its patents,  enter into a contract agreeing to pay a percentage 
of any royalties  obtained from licensing.49 This use of revenue sharing has 
                                                     
45 See 2016 FTC REPORT, supra note 27, at 83 (“Ninety-three percent of Litigation 
PAE licenses followed settlement of ongoing patent litigation.”), 43 (“[T]he 
behavior of Litigation PAEs is consistent with nuisance litigation.”). 
46 Id. at 83 n.234 (“By contrast, only 29% of Portfolio PAE licenses followed 
litigation.”). 
47 See 2011 FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 66; Hagiu and Yoffie, supra note 3, at 
56. 
48 See, e.g., 2011 FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 60 (“For the most part, PAEs 
purchase patents, and then sell or license them as assets . . . .”); Hagiu & Yoffie, 
supra note 3, at 52 (describing “arbitrage opportunities available to nonpracticing 
entities”), 62 (“In many cases, nonpracticing entities make lump-sum payments to 
inventors in exchange for control of their patents before any litigation occurs . . . 
.”). 
49 See 2016 FTC REPORT, supra note 27, at 48–49 (“With one exception, each 
Litigation PAE reported the use of revenue sharing in at least some of its patent 
acquisition agreements. Approximately half of the Litigation PAEs used revenue-
sharing agreements exclusively.” (footnotes omitted)). In addition to revenue 
sharing, a number of firms did not acquire title to the patents that they asserted at 
all, instead merely acquiring an exclusive license conferring standing to enforce the 
rights. Id. at 49 (“[S]ix of the Litigation PAEs reported acquiring the rights to some 
patents through an exclusive license; in those cases, the patent owner retained 
ownership of the patents but granted the PAE enough rights to enforce the patents 
on its own against potential infringers.”). In both models of acquisition, the entities 
had an ongoing contractual relationship with the prior patent owner while they 
engaged in their licensing activity, who themselves had an ongoing interest in the 
success of the endeavor. See id. (“These agreements kept many patent sellers 
engaged in the PAEs’ assertion activity. In fact, some Litigation PAEs referred to 
patent sellers as their partners or clients. Under some agreements, patent sellers 
agreed to assist with litigation, such as by making inventors available to testify . . . 
.”). 
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an impact on the incentives of patent holders when dealing with 
intermediaries.50  
 When a patent holder enters into a revenue sharing agreement with 
an intermediary, it has a continuing interest in the success of the 
intermediary’s licensing activities. In contrast, if the patent holder sells its 
patents outright, it would be indifferent to the intermediary’s success 
because its compensation would be fixed. As a result of this continuing 
interest, the patent holder’s interest would align with that of the 
intermediary: both parties would benefit from the intermediary obtaining 
the maximum royalty from its licensing endeavors. In addition, when 
selecting an intermediary with which to trade, patent holders would value 
intermediaries on their perceived ability to successfully license their patents, 
because the patent holders’ compensation would not be guaranteed. 
II. EX POST LICENSING IN THE SHADOW OF LITIGATION 
 Patent intermediaries can be distinguished from many platforms in 
other markets because one set of customers appear to be compelled to 
interact with the intermediary. This is because prospective licensees often 
interact with the intermediary either under the threat of litigation or after 
being sued. In this regard, their decision to enter into a patent license differs 
from a decision to enter into many other forms of negotiated agreements. 
Nevertheless, as this section considers, ex post licensing can be analyzed as 
a technology market transaction notwithstanding the presence of litigation. 
 A non-exclusive ex post license is a voluntary transaction made to 
extinguish an entitlement assigned to the patent owner.51  It is the patent 
owner’s legal entitlement that is the source of the prospective licensee’s 
obligation to pay royalties to the patent holder. Absent an ex post license, a 
patent holder could enforce its entitlement in court to obtain a reasonable 
royalty. The prospective licensee may have already incurred financial 
liability to the patent owner at the time that the license is negotiated by 
selling an infringing product without knowledge of the patent owner’s 
patents.52 An ex post license is a negotiated payment to release that financial 
liability. It is negotiated by both parties to avoid the costs and uncertainty of 
                                                     
50 An intermediary that uses revenue sharing may operate in a manner similar to a 
two-sided platform, as opposed to as a reseller engaged in arbitrage. Rather than 
acquiring patents and then attempting to profit by obtaining royalties greater than 
the acquisition price, it extracts its compensation as a share of any revenues 
received from successfully consummating agreements with licensees. See, e.g., 
Marc Rysman, The Economics of Two-Sided Markets, 23 J. ECON. PERSPS., no. 3, 
2009, at 125, 126; Andrei Hagiu & Julian Wright, Marketplace or Reseller? 2 
(Harvard Bus. Sch. Working Paper No. 13-092, 2014).  
51 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 24, at 1092. 
52 See 2011 FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 54. 
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a court adjudication of infringement, validity and damages. As discussed 
below, its valuation reflects both the value of the underlying entitlement as 
well as the value of certainty and litigation avoidance. 
A. The Source of Demand for Ex Post Licensees 
 The patent system grants inventors an entitlement against 
infringement as a means to ensure that inventors have adequate financial 
incentive to invest in innovation. In the absence of patent protection, 
innovations are subject to free riding because they are public goods.53 Once 
an innovation is created, there is no way to prevent others from copying it 
and it costs nothing for them to do so.54 Absent legal protection, an 
innovators’ competitors could copy its innovation at no cost and create 
competitive products, lowering prices such that the innovator could not 
recoup its investment in research and development.55 To ameliorate this 
concern, the patent system grants inventors a set of rights, which often 
includes the right to exclude others through seeking injunctive relief in the 
courts.56 In the shadow of an injunction, the patent holder and prospective 
licensee may negotiate a royalty rate which would both allow the 
implementer to profitably produce infringing goods and would allow the 
patent owner to recover profits greater than it would earn from producing 
the goods itself.57  
 In practice, however, many ex post licenses are not negotiated 
around a potential injunction. That is because—in addition to the right to 
exclude—the patent holder enjoys a right to receive monetary damages 
from those that infringe a patent.58 Most patent intermediaries do not 
manufacture products themselves. This limits the remedies that they are 
likely to obtain for infringement because a patent owner that does not 
practice the patent itself is frequently unable to establish that it meets the 
                                                     
53 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 2 at 4 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 
FTC REPORT]; OECD POLICY ROUNDTABLES: COMPETITION, PATENTS AND 
INNOVATION 189, 190 (2007) [hereinafter OECD 2007]. 
54 See 2003 FTC REPORT, supra note 53, at ch. 2 at 4. 
55 OECD 2007, supra note 53, at 190. 
56 See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012); Paltex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 599 
(Fed. Cir. 1985). This use of property rights to allow innovators to internalize the 
positive externalities created by their inventions is consistent with the use that 
Professor Ronald Coase proposed with respect to pollution and adopted in some 
environmental regulation contexts. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. 
& ECON. 1, 8 (1960); see also W. Kip Viscusi, John M. Vernon & Joseph E. 
Harrington, Jr., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 704 (3rd ed.2001). 
57 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Contracting Around Liability Rules, 100 CAL. L. REV. 
463, 468 (2012). 
58 See 35 U.S.C. § 284. 
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equitable requirements to be entitled to injunctive relief.59 In such cases, it 
can only recover damages in the amount of a reasonable royalty.60 
 Therefore, for many intermediaries, the patent grant operates as an 
entitlement to a reasonable royalty protected by a liability rule.61 If the 
patent owner were to enforce its entitlement in court, the court would grant 
it a royalty that should approximate the royalty that it would have been able 
to negotiate.62 As a result, the expected royalty that a court would grant 
                                                     
59 See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006); see also Ben 
Depoorter, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Patent Market Failure, 1 ERASMUS 
L. REV., no. 4, 2008, at 59, 63; Lemley, supra note 57, at 472. 
60 A patent holder is entitled to damages measured as either lost profits or as a 
reasonable royalty. See, e.g., Minco, Inc. v. Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 95 F.3d 1109, 
1119 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“The Patent Act permits damages awards to encompass both 
lost profits and a reasonable royalty on that portion of an infringer’s sales not 
included in the lost profit calculation.”). If the patent holder does not compete with 
the infringer in a product market, then it is not entitled to lost profits. Id. (noting 
that a patent holder would not be entitled to lost profits if, “[f]or instance, a patent 
owner [does] not operate in the specific geographical area covered by the infringer 
or [does] not have . . . the manufacturing or marketing capacity to make the 
infringer’s sales” and that “the patentee would still be entitled to a reasonable 
royalty on each of those sales”). Therefore, a patent holder that does not produce a 
product at all would only be entitled to damages in the amount of a reasonable 
royalty. 
61 For non-practicing patent holders, bargaining for a patent license departs from 
Coase’s model because a manufacturer negotiating for a license is merely 
contracting to avoid the imposition of a court-determined valuation and the costs of 
obtaining said valuation—not exclusion from the market. See Lemley, supra note 
57, at 472; see also Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a 
Legal Entitlement To Facilitate Cosian Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995); James 
E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in 
Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440 (1995); Robert P. Merges, Of Property 
Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV 2655, 2655 (1994) 
(“[A] property rule is a legal entitlement that can only be infringed after bargaining 
with the entitlement holder. The holder thus sets the price for infringing ex ante. 
Under a liability rule, by contrast, one may infringe first, and a tribunal will 
determine the appropriate compensation in an ex post proceeding.”). Commentators 
have observed that non-practicing patent holders negotiate settlements with 
significant frequency and that such contracting has also been observed in a number 
of markets for other intellectual property licenses protected by liability rules. See 
Lemley, supra note 57, at 476. 
62 One standard for measuring remedies is “the royalty upon which the parties 
would have agreed had they successfully negotiated an agreement just before 
infringement began.” Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324 
(Fed. Cir. 2009). Such a hypothetical negotiation assumes that the asserted patent is 
valid and infringed. Id. at 1325. In contrast, a negotiated license may include a 
discount to reflect the probability of liability. 
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provides both the patent holder and the prospective licensee with a 
benchmark for valuing the entitlement. The expectation would reflect both 
the expectation regarding the size of the damage award, as well as a 
discount for the probability of a finding of liability.63 If it is likely that 
patent would be found invalid or not infringed, both parties would discount 
the risk-adjusted expected royalty. Therefore, even if a patent is very likely 
invalid, there should be a value that a prospective licensee would attach to 
an ex post license, albeit a very low one reflecting the low probability of 
liability.64 
 In addition to the value of the underlying entitlement, both the 
patent owner and the prospective licensee would derive value from an ex 
post license by avoiding the cost and uncertainty of a court proceeding to 
determine a reasonable royalty.65 Taking a license would minimize the risks 
flowing from unpredictable outcomes of the litigation process.66 In addition, 
the parties would derive value from avoiding its high costs.  
 Although patent owners typically receive monetary compensation 
from an ex post license, both parties to the license could receive value from 
the transaction. Despite the fact that it may be a defendant in a lawsuit, a 
prospective licensee may derive value from an ex post license because it 
provides certainty regarding its liability to the patent holder.67  A patent 
                                                     
63 See Michael P. Akemann, John A. Blair & David J. Teece, Patent Enforecment 
in an Uncertain World: Widespread Infringement and the Paradox of Value for 
Patented Technologies 11 (Tusher Ctr. for the Mgmt. of Intellectual Capital, 
Working Paper No. 6, 2016) (explaining how parties to a license negotiation make 
a “certainty adjustment” to discount an antiticpated reasonable royalty for the 
probability of a finding of validity, infringement, and enforceability). 
64 This is evidenced in part by the presence of defensive aggregators, whose 
customers pay them to obtain licenses for “patents that might threaten subscribers.” 
Hagiu & Yoffie, supra note 3, at 56. 
65 Cases have recognized that values paid in settlement of litigation often reflect the 
value of avoiding litigation. In 1889, the Supreme Court recognized that “many 
considerations … may induce the payment” of a “sum in settlement of a claim for 
an alleged infringement,” and that “[t]he avoidance of the risk and expense of 
litigation will always be a potential motive for a settlement.” Rude v. Westcott, 130 
U.S. 152, 164 (1898); see also Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 
575 F.2d 1152, 1164 n.11 (6th Cir. 1978) (“License fees negotiated in the face of a 
threat of high litigation costs ‘may be strongly influenced by a desire to avoid full 
litigation.’” (quoting Tights, Inc. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 442 F. Supp. 159, 166 
(M.D.N.C. 1977))). 
66 One concern regarding the use of liability rules is the court’s inability to 
accurately assess damages. Lemley, supra note 57, at 466 (“The essential insight is 
that court determinations of damages carry a risk of error: the court might value the 
property at more or less than it is really worth.”). 
67 See id. at 472 (“[P]atent and copyright owners who contract to settle a liability 
rule case are resolving uncertainty as to liability as well as damages.”). 
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owner is permitted to recover damages for six years of past infringement.68 
A prospective licensee would value knowing its license costs prior to 
investing in producing a product for six years. This could allow the 
prospective licensee to know with greater certainty whether producing a 
product would be profitable, prior to incurring the hazard of a loss after the 
liability was incurred.69  
B. The Impact of Litigation on Ex Post License Negotiation 
 If the parties are unable to reach agreement on the value of an ex 
post license through negotiation, the patent holder may resort to litigation to 
enforce its rights. The litigation process provides both parties with more 
information regarding patent validity and infringement and the likely 
damage award. This additional information may narrow their range of 
disagreement, facilitating license negotiation. In the event that the parties 
cannot reach a negotiated outcome before trial, the court will ultimately 
determine liability and provide an appropriate award.  
 In addition, although litigation resolves uncertainty, it is very 
costly. The costs that it imposes on both parties may—particularly for 
disputes involving individual patents—rival the expected value of a license. 
In such cases, both parties may make strategic use of the influence of 
litigation costs on the value the other side attaches to negotiating a license. 
As such, a patent holder’s use of litigation can serve different roles in 
facilitating licensing, including reducing uncertainty and increasing 
licensees’ willingness to pay for a license. 
1. The Use of Litigation to Resolve Uncertainty 
 Prior to litigation, parties have considerable uncertainty and 
asymmetric information regarding the underlying facts that will be taken 
into account by the factfinder adjudicating their dispute. The litigation 
process can close these information gaps through a number of incremental 
steps. There are several points where the court may issue an opinion on 
discrete issues including claim construction and specific questions of 
validity and infringement.70 The parties produce confidential information on 
a rolling basis through discovery. The parties are often required to explain 
their contentions regarding validity, infringement and remedies through 
interrogatories and expert reports.71  As a result, the gap between the 
                                                     
68 35 U.S.C. § 286 (2012). 
69 2011 FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 53. 
70 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b), 56. 
71 Several jurisdictions explicitly require litigants to disclose their contentions 
regarding validity and infringement early in discovery. See, e.g., N.D. CAL. PATENT 
L.R. 3-1, 3-3. In other jurisdictions, the federal rules allow parties to pose 
contention interrogatories directed towards these issues. See FED. R. CIV. P. 33. The 
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parties’ appreciation of the expected outcome should narrow as the 
litigation process continues. Ultimately, the court will reach a decision on 
liability and damages at the conclusion of the process. 
 The validity of any asserted patent claim is uncertain.72 Although a 
patent enjoys a presumption of validity, a defendant can overcome this 
presumption at trial. Often, this is done through the identification of prior 
patents, literature or products that were not available to the patent examiner 
when the patent application was being considered. If defendants are willing 
to engage in extensive search for such prior art, they frequently are able to 
uncover additional materials that were not available to the examiner.73 
When these materials are produced and explained in discovery, the parties 
are better able to evaluate patent validity. 
 There is also uncertainty over whether infringement has occurred. 
There are two components to the infringement inquiry.74 First, the court 
construes the claims in a claim construction order, examining both the 
                                                                                                                       
federal rules also require disclosure of expert opinions through reports submitted 
during the course of discovery. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(D). 
72 Validity is determined on a claim-by-claim basis. See 35 U.S.C. § 253. Patents 
often contain many claims, each of a slightly different scope. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 
112(b) (“The specification shall conclude with one or more claims . . . distinctly 
claiming the subject matter which the inventor . . . regards as the invention.”); 35 
U.S.C. § 112(d) (“[A] claim in dependent form shall . . . specify a further limitation 
of the subject matter claimed . . . .”); Clearstream Wastewater Systems, Inc. v. 
Hydro-Action, Inc., 206 F.3d 1440, 1446 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[I]t is presumed that 
different words used in different claims result in a difference in meaning and scope 
for each of the claims.”). It may be the case that the broader claims may be 
invalidated by the prior art while the narrower claims remain valid. Often, a patent 
applicant will include both broad and narrow claims in an attempt to secure the 
broadest patent protection available, with the expectation that some of the broader 
claims may be invalidated by unappreciated prior art. Therefore, the uncertainty is 
not whether the patent itself is wholly invalid but, rather, what will be the scope of 
its valid claims. 
73 Litigation tends to develop a factual record for the factfinder that is more robust 
than that considered by the patent office. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 
U.S. 91, 111 (2011) (“[I]f the PTO did not have all material facts before it, its 
considered judgment may lose significant force.”); Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. 
Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 331 n.21 (1971) (patent validity is “apt for 
litigation” and, “because of the intrinsic nature of the subject, the first decision can 
be quite wrong, or derived from an insufficient record or presentation” (citations 
omitted)). 
74 See, e.g., Advanced Steel Recovery, LLC v. X-Body Equipment, Inc., 808 F.3d 
1313, 1316–17 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Determining infringement requires two steps: 
construing the claims and comparing the properly construed claims to the accused 
product.” (citing Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 
2009))). 
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intrinsic record of the patent, including its written specification and 
prosecution history, as well as relevant extrinsic evidence offered by the 
parties.75 The court’s decision on claim construction often resolves all 
ambiguity regarding the scope of the claims, which often derives from the 
inherent ambiguity of language. In addition, some courts have local patent 
rules which provide a process where parties exchange their contentions and 
evidence on claim construction prior to the issuance of the decision, often 
narrowing the scope of disagreement in advance.76 Once the claims are 
construed, the court considers infringement by comparing the claims to the 
accused product.77 There may be multiple accused products at issue in a 
case, and the infringement of particular products may vary depending on 
which claims are found valid. The parties may not be able to reach 
agreement on the result of this analysis ex ante because, in many cases, it is 
only the prospective licensee which possesses full information regarding the 
attributes of its product. This information asymmetry is reduced during the 
course of discovery, as the accused infringer is required to produce 
information regarding the attributes of its products.78 
 Finally, there is considerable uncertainty regarding the amount of 
the damages that the court will award. A large amount of this uncertainty 
stems from the Federal Circuit’s reasonable royalty jurisprudence, which 
acknowledges that “there may be more than one reliable method for 
estimating a reasonable royalty” and that the “record [at trial] may support a 
range of ‘reasonable’ royalties.”79 In addition, there are two sources of 
information asymmetries: the patent owner is in possession of prior license 
agreements which inform the reasonable royalty rate80 and the prospective 
licensee is in possession of information regarding the profitability of its 
accused products. 
                                                     
75 Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 831, 833 (2015); Phillips v. 
AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
76 See, e.g., N.D. CAL. PATENT L.R. 4 et seq. 
77 PC Connector Sols. LLC v. SmartDisk Corp., 406 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 
2005); Power Mosfet Techs., LLC v. Siemens AG, 378 F.3d 1396, 1407 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) (explaining that the infringement inquiry “requires a comparison of the 
properly construed claim to the accused device”). 
78 Several jurisdictions have local patent rules that explicitly require the defendant 
to produce technical information that informs whether its accused products infringe 
the asserted patents. See, e.g., N.D.CAL.PATENT L.R. 3-4 (“[T]he party opposing a 
claim of patent infringement shall produce . . . documentation sufficient to show the 
operation of any aspects or elements of an Accused Instrumentality identified by 
the patent claimant . . . .”). 
79 Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
80 See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
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2. The Impact of Litigation Costs 
 Patent litigation is costly. In addition to reducing uncertainty and 
information asymmetries, litigation imposes costs upon both patent holders 
and prospective licensees that influences the value that they attach to ex post 
licenses. One recent survey indicated that a patent litigation with 
$1,000,000 in controversy—the smallest amount studied—would cost each 
party $600,000 to $700,000 in legal fees to adjudicate through trial.81 When 
the cost of adjudication approaches the amount in controversy, parties’ 
licensing behavior is necessarily influenced by a desire to minimize 
litigation costs. 
 Prospective licensees can engage in opportunistic behavior when 
they perceive that the patent holder’s expected risk-adjusted royalty would 
be less than its cost of filing litigation. In such cases, the prospective 
licensee may refrain from seeking a license because it would anticipate that 
the patent holder would not bring suit to collect a royalty. This may be even 
more likely in the event that the prospective licensee perceives that it would 
be difficult or costly for the patent holder to detect its infringement. In 
particular—because its expected liability upon a finding of infringement 
would approximate the royalty obtained through negotiation—a prospective 
licensee may have little disincentive to engage in such holdout.82 
 Patent holders can also engage in opportunistic behavior when they 
assert a patent whose license value to the prospective licensee may be below 
the cost of litigation. Litigation costs inflate the prospective licensee’s 
willingness to pay for a patent license. The patent system effectively 
imposes a cost on parties accused with patent infringement, due to their 
obligation to satisfy the procedural rules of the court system. The system 
assigns these costs on defendants in any case in which the patent owner can 
articulate a claim of infringement that is colorable enough to survive a 
motion to dismiss.83 Since the standard for surviving a motion to dismiss is 
lower than the standard for establishing liability at trial, it may be easier for 
a patent owner to impose these costs than to obtain a judgment against the 
prospective licensee.84 Once a patent owner files such a suit, the prospective 
                                                     
81 See AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 
35 (2013);  Colleen V. Chien, Holding Up and Holding Out, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. 
& TECH. L. REV. 1, 25–26 (2014). 
82 See Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1158 (6th 
Cir. 1978) (“[T]he infringer would have nothing to lose, and everything to gain if 
he could count on paying only the normal, routine royalty non-infringers might 
have paid.”). 
83 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 558–59 (2007) (noting the high 
costs of discovery imposed upon defendants in complex litigation). 
84 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (holding that a complaint that is 
plausible on its face may survive a motion to dismiss). 
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licensee must either bear these costs or negotiate a license. A patent holder 
would often be able to exploit these costs by offering a license priced just 
below the cost of defending the lawsuit. The price paid for such a license 
would reflect litigation cost avoidance and not either party’s expected risk-
adjusted royalty. 
III. PLATFORMS IN TECHNOLOGY MARKETS 
 Consummating a properly-valued ex post license has the potential 
to create value for both patent holders, who receive a royalty, and 
prospective licensees, who receive a release of current or future liability. 
Nevertheless, such transactions may be frustrated by high transaction costs. 
These include the costs to locate relevant patent owners or prospective 
licensees due to failure of patent notice.85 They also include the costs of 
valuing the license—particularly if disagreements are resolved through 
litigation.86 Intermediaries may serve a role in overcoming these obstacles 
to ex post licensing. 
 Intermediaries in technology markets may serve an analogous role 
to platforms in other markets. Two-sided platforms connect two groups of 
customers to facilitate transactions that would not occur absent the 
platform.87 Common examples are newspapers, which interact with both 
readers and advertisers; operating systems, which bring together end users 
and complimentary application providers; and payment cards, which broker 
transactions between merchants and consumers.88 Similarly, patent 
intermediaries may connect patent holders with prospective licensees. 
 Indeed, prior literature has recognized that some patent 
intermediaries operate as two-sided platforms. These include patent 
auctions and on-line marketplaces connecting patent sellers with 
prospective purchasers.89 Both broker the outright sale and purchase of 
patents. This literature has, however, also noted that such platforms have 
tended to be commercial failures.90 In contrast to these platforms, ex post 
licensing intermediaries trade in license rights and not in patents 
themselves. 
 The analysis of platforms in two-sided markets can inform the 
analysis of patent intermediaries in technology markets. Two-sided 
                                                     
85 See 2011 FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at ch. 3.  
86 See supra Part II. 
87 OECD POLICY ROUNDTABLES: TWO-SIDED MARKETS 23, 23 (2009) [hereinafter 
OECD 2009].  
88 Id.  
89 Hagiu & Yoffie, supra note 3, at 53–56 (describing Yet2, Tynax, and Ocean 
Tomo). 
90 Id. at 53 (describing these platforms as “A Failed Solution”).  
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platforms can be successful when transaction costs prevent parties from 
negotiating licenses on their own but the platforms are capable of 
overcoming the costs.91 Platforms are able to overcome these costs when 
they stand between two distinct groups of customers that each enjoy indirect 
network effects from having access to the other.92 An indirect network 
effect is an externality that a party enjoys due to the opportunity to trade 
with customers on the other side of a market.93  For example, advertisers 
benefit from the number of readers of a newspaper and a credit card holder 
benefits from the number of merchants that honor the card.94  In both 
examples, each opposite party presents an opportunity for a beneficial 
transaction. 
A. Indirect Network Effects 
 Intermediaries that facilitate ex post licensing may have aspects of a 
two-sided platform because both patent holders and prospective licensees 
could experience indirect network effects in ex post licensing. As explained 
below, patent owners benefit from dealing with a platform that can reach 
the most licensees as they will enjoy a larger royalty base. Likewise, 
licensees benefit from a platform that gives them access to the most patent 
holders as they will enjoy the broadest freedom to operate.  
 Patent owners can experience network effects when they engage in 
non-exclusive licensing. This is because the grant of a non-exclusive license 
to one party does not diminish its value to other parties. A non-exclusive 
license is merely a release from a claim of infringement and does not confer 
                                                     
91 See Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report, 
RAND J. ECON. 8–9 (2006). 
92 See David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, The Industrial Organization of 
Markets with Two-Sided Platforms, 3 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 151, 154 (2007) 
(“Generally, one can think of two-sided platforms as arising in situations in which 
there are externalities and in which transactions costs, broadly considered, prevent 
the two sides from solving this externality directly.”); Rysman, supra note 50, at 
125 (“Broadly speaking, a two-sided market is one in which 1) two sets of agents 
interact through an intermediary or platform, and 2) the decisions of each set of 
agents affects the outcomes of the other set of agents, typically through an 
externality.”). In addition to this property, the literature has advanced a number of 
analyses to determine whether a market is two-sided. See generally, e.g., Lapo 
Filistrucchi, How Many Markets Are Two-Sided?, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., July 
2010, at 1 (reviewing the literature). 
93 See Joseph Farrell & Paul Klemperer, Coordination and Lock-In: Competition 
with Switching Costs and Network Effects, 3 HANDBOOK INDUS. ORG. 1970, 1974 
(2007). 
94 OECD 2009, supra note 87, at 26. 
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the licensee with any marketplace exclusivity.95  Once a patent holder grants 
a non-exclusive license, the value of that license is not diminished by the 
subsequent grant of additional licenses because their grant will not impact 
competition in the licensee’s product market.96 Therefore, granting 
additional non-exclusive licenses will serve only to increase the patent 
holder’s royalty base. In the case of pervasive infringement, maximizing the 
number of licenses granted would increase the amount of the prospective 
royalty base captured.  
 Prospective licensees also experience network effects from the 
number of patent owners that they can access through platforms. A platform 
that would provide access to as many relevant patent owners as possible 
would allow the patent owners to obtain maximum freedom to operate. This 
is most pronounced in complex technologies, such as information and 
communications technology. In these technology fields, new products may 
infringe upon hundreds, or even thousands, of patent claims.97 It is often not 
feasible for firms developing new products to determine, prior to finalizing 
product design, the identity and owner of patents which their new product 
may infringe.98  To reduce the risk of unforeseen liability, manufacturers 
often desire freedom to operate—that is, the knowledge that they are 
licensed from all patent owners with patents relevant to their product.99  In 
complex technologies, there may by hundreds of such patent holders and a 
manufacturer would value securing a license from as many of those parties 
as possible.  
 Both patent owners and prospective licensees experience these 
network effects because each group derives value from consummating a 
license agreement—provided that the agreement matches relevant products 
and relevant patents. As previously noted, there can be considerable 
                                                     
95 A non-exclusive patent license is recognized to be nothing more than a covenant 
by the patent holder not to sue. See De Forest Radio Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United 
States, 273 U.S. 236, 242 (1927) (“As a license passes no interest in the monopoly, 
it has been described as a mere waiver of the right to sue by the patentee.” (quoting 
Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912))); TransCore, LP v. Elec. Transaction 
Consultants Corp., 563 F.3d 1271, 1275–76 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing authorities); 
Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr Stahlecker & Grill GmbH v. Schubert & Salzer 
Maschinenfabrik Aktiengesellschaft, 829 F.2d 1075, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“[A] 
patent license agreement is in essence nothing more than a promise by the licensor 
not to sue the licensee.”). 
96 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR 
THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 19 (2017) (a “non-exclusive license  
normally does not diminish competition that would occur in its absence.”) 
[hereinafter 2017 GUIDELINES]. 
97 See 2011 FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 56. 
98 See id. at 77–78. 
99 See id. at 54. 
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uncertainty regarding the scope of a patent. However, so long as there is a 
nonzero likelihood that a patent reads upon a product, both licensor and 
licensee would obtain value from resolving that uncertainty with a royalty 
payment that reflects the likelihood of liability.100 Conversely, there would 
be no value created by an attempt to license patents claiming technologies 
completely unrelated to a licensee’s products. Therefore, each group would 
value a platform that provides access to enough members of the opposite 
group to ensure that a relevant match can be made.  
 Different patent intermediaries may exploit these network effects in 
different ways. Patent assertion entities may negotiate with a large number 
of prospective licensees on behalf of individual patent holders. Defensive 
aggregators may offer their manufacturing members the prospect of licenses 
from a number of different patent holders. Aggregators may enter into 
agreements with both patent holders and prospective licensees, offering 
each access to many of the other. In each case, the intermediary offers 
parties greater scope than they would be able to achieve on their own. 
B. Mechanisms for Connecting Patent Holders and Prospective 
Licensees 
 In order to create value for both parties, a patent intermediary must 
first facilitate the identification and pairing of relevant patents and 
products—a process which is recognized to be costly and difficult for many 
parties acting unilaterally.101 Prospective licensees may face difficulties 
searching for patents relevant to their products because of the difficulty of 
searching electronic patent databases for technical concepts which may be 
described by varying language, particularly in crowded technical fields with 
many patents.102 Similarly, it may be difficult for patent owners to identify 
products that embody their patents, particularly if the patent features are 
embodied in source code or are otherwise difficult to reverse engineer.103  
 Intermediaries could serve a role in overcoming these challenges by 
serving as matchmakers. In other markets, matchmakers such as on-line 
marketplaces and dating services create value by helping parties find each 
other to transact.104 Similarly, patent intermediaries could create value by 
                                                     
100 This royalty payment could be very low if the expected probability of liability is 
low, as noted above. Supra Part II.A. 
101 See Hagiu & Yoffie, supra note 3, at 47. 
102 See 2011 FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 90–92. 
103 See Hagiu & Yoffie, supra note 3, at 47. 
104 See Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 92, at 155, 158 (“The fundamental role of 
a two-sided platform in the economy is to enable parties to realize gains from trade 
or other interactions by reducing the transaction costs of finding each other and 
interacting. Two-sided platforms do this by matchmaking, building audiences, and 
minimizing costs.”). 
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matching relevant patents and products and facilitating the valuation and 
negotiation of a license between their owners. They could identify matches 
through a variety of means, leveraging both relationships with patent 
owners and prospective licensees, as well as industry and technical 
knowledge. 
 It is possible that patent aggregators could achieve an effect similar 
to matchmaking by aggregating patents into larger portfolios.105 If a 
portfolio is sufficiently large, parties may determine that it is likely to 
contain patents that read on the products of the prospective licensee.106 The 
parties may mutually agree on a valuation of the portfolio that reflects the 
probability that—had the intermediary performed a thorough analysis 
considering all of the constituent patents—a number of its patents would be 
valid and infringed by the licensed products.107 
 Intermediaries can offer patent owners and prospective licensees 
connections with counterparts that they would not be able to reach on their 
own. For example, a lone inventor may lack the industry knowledge to 
identify all of the manufacturers utilizing its patented invention and the 
inventor may lack the resources and contacts to needed to begin 
negotiations with those manufacturers once they are identified. 
Intermediaries can use a variety of mechanisms to connect with prospective 
licensees. Sometimes this is done through contract. For example, a 
defensive aggregator has contracts in place to negotiate on behalf of a 
number of prospective licensees. In many other cases, the intermediary may 
deal with prospective licensees through arms-length negotiation—often 
done in the shadow of litigation. In such cases, the scope of an 
intermediary’s reach is determined by its capacity to find prospective 
licensees and to credibly initiate litigation. It can leverage relationships and 
industry knowledge to search for potential licensees. It can also leverage 
both relationships and financing mechanisms to provide access to necessary 
                                                     
105 Symmetrically, a defensive aggregator could negotiate a broad license covering 
the products produced by all of its members. 
106 See Akemann, Blair & Teece, supra note 63, at 7 (“licensees typically wish to 
extend the license to all potentially relevant patents in the licensor’s portfolio and 
all of the licensee’s potentially relevant products”). 
107 This matchmaking effect is an additional reason that parties may license patents 
as part of portfolios, in addition to the reduction in contracting costs and potential 
for portfolio effects that doing so may provide. See id. at 6 (“it is generally not 
practical to try to negotiate licenses on a product-by-product (or service-by-
service), patent-by-patent, country-by-country basis as the transaction costs would 
be prohibitive”); Hagiu & Yoffie, supra note 3, at 47 (“Potential buyers or licensees 
may not place much value on a given patent sold by itself unless it compliments a 
portfolio that they already own.”). Nevertheless, the aggregation of patents into 
portfolios may impact technology market competition if the patents are not also 
available for license individually. See, infra, text accompanying notes 145 - 147. 
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legal representation. In many cases, an intermediary deals with both patent 
holders and prospective licensees that are both either innovators or 
manufacturers with little legal sophistication of their own; it can effect 
reach by providing licensing strategy, access to legal representation and 
financing, and search capabilities that these firms may lack themselves.  
 In practice, intermediaries use a mixture of both contract and arms-
length negotiation to connect with patent holders and prospective licensees. 
The 2016 Report, for example, describes patent assertion entities using 
Litigation business models which connect with patent holders through 
contract and negotiate with prospective licensees.108 In contrast, defensive 
aggregators contract with licensees and negotiate on their behalf with patent 
holders.109 And, as the 2011 Report describes, patent aggregators may 
contract with both patent owners and licensees.110  
C. Platform Fees 
 Platforms obtain their revenues from fees charged to the customers 
that they connect.111 A patent intermediary operating as a platform could 
similarly obtain revenues from patent holders and prospective licensees. It 
could use revenue sharing as a mechanism for charging a participation fee 
to patent holders. When contracting with a patent owner the intermediary 
could commit to pay the patent owner a percentage share of its revenues 
from licensing; the revenues that the platform retains are its fee. Similarly, 
an intermediary could use license pricing as a means of charging a fee to a 
prospective licensee. When negotiating a license amount with a prospective 
licensee, the intermediary’s reservation value could be either raised or 
lowered, effectively either charging a fee or offering a discount to the 
prospective licensee. 
 The price that a platform charges both sets of its customers can 
impact the volume of transactions.112 A platform can tailor the relative size 
of the prices charged to each set of customers to capture the indirect 
network effects experienced by each.113 If customers on one side of the 
platform experience strong network effects from the presence of customers 
on the other side, the platform may charge the former a high fee to 
participate and subsidize its services to the latter to increase their 
participation. For example, newspapers may offer online content to readers 
                                                     
108 See 2016 FTC REPORT, supra note 27, at 47–50. 
109 See 2011 FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 66; Hagiu & Yoffie, supra note 3, at 56. 
110 See 2011 FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 65. 
111 See Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 92, at 159. 
112 OECD 2009, supra note 87, at 29. 
113 Id.  
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for free and earn their revenue from selling impressions to advertisers.114 
Similarly, credit cards may offer cardholders a rewards program to 
participate, while charging merchants a fee for each transaction.115 If a 
patent intermediary functioned as such a platform, it could also use its price 
structure to influence participation by patent holders and prospective 
licensees. 
 This raises the possibility that patent intermediaries could use 
participation fees to capitalize upon the network externalities experienced 
by their customers. For example, intermediaries that secure licenses on 
behalf of patent owners could skew prices to take advantage of the fact that 
patent owners would maximize their royalties by having a large number of 
licensees.116 Provided that the intermediary provides the patent owner with 
access to a sufficient volume of prospective licensees, the patent owner may 
be willing to pay a considerably high fee in consideration for access to the 
platform. In such cases, the intermediary may actually offer licenses to 
prospective licensees at a discount in order to increase their participation.117  
 This may operate as a relatively lower settlement offer during 
license negotiations. Such intermediaries could conceivably make licenses 
available at rates lower than patent owners would demand in settlement 
negotiation in order to obtain quick settlements—and avoid protracted and 
costly disputes over valuation—increasing the quantity of licenses sold. 
D. Distinguishing Between Intermediaries Operating as 
Platforms and Intermediaries Engaged in Litigation-
Avoidance Arbitrage 
 Not all patent intermediaries serve the matchmaking function of a 
platform. While some may do so, facilitating licensing by overcoming 
transaction costs, others may engage in practices that extract rents based 
upon those same transaction costs. This is similar to the dual role that patent 
litigation can serve: it can be both a means of facilitating licensing 
transactions by overcoming uncertainty and information asymmetries and as 
a means of extracting payments motivated by litigation cost avoidance. 
Intermediaries which use litigation to perform the latter function may 
                                                     
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 32. 
117 Participation in this context involves negotiation for a settlement. If the 
intermediary could not accept a royalty payment below a prospective licensee’s 
reservation values due to its own costs and the need to provide competitive returns 
to patent owners, then the prospective licensee would not accept a negotiated 
license and would instead engage in protracted litigation that would provide no 
royalties absent court-ordered remedies. 
294                        THE LICENSING FUNCTION OF [Vol. 15 
PATENT INTERMEDIARIES 
operate in a manner superficially similar to two-sided platforms—securing 
large volumes of licenses for a number of patent holders—yet do not create 
or realize value in the same manner. 
 Intermediaries could use litigation as a means of increasing demand 
for licenses. By pricing licenses below the cost of defending a lawsuit, an 
intermediary could obtain a payment for each lawsuit filed, irrespective of 
the size of the royalty that it would otherwise be entitled to from each 
defendant.118 As noted above, this is possible because the substantive 
standard for pleading a complaint—and thus imposing litigation costs on a 
defendant—is lower than the standard for establishing liability at trial. A 
patent holder exploiting this strategy would benefit from litigating against 
the largest number of defendants as possible; rather than obtaining license 
payments reflecting the value of its underlying entitlement it obtains 
payments reflecting the number of distinct parties upon which it can impose 
litigation costs.119  If the intermediary enjoys economies of scale with 
respect to litigation, then it may be profit maximizing for it to file the 
maximum number of lawsuits. 
 The scale economies of litigation can be pronounced because an 
intermediary’s costs of litigating against additional parties is relatively low. 
When the same patents are asserted against different defendants, there are a 
number of common issues of fact.120 Some common issues are patent 
validity, including the scope of the prior art and claim construction, and 
some aspects relevant to damages including the licensor’s licensing history 
with respect to the patent.121 Because of these common issues, litigants can 
experience significant scale economies by joining additional parties in their 
litigation efforts. 
 These scale economies are even stronger when there are common 
issues regarding infringement. Often, accused devices from different 
manufacturers may employ identical technology. This can happen when an 
                                                     
118 See supra Part II.B.2. 
119 For example, one manner in which a patent holder may accomplish this would 
be to assert its patent against multiple downstream users or resellers of a product as 
opposed to bringing a single action against the manufacturer of the product. 
120 Courts often recognize these common issues of fact when consolidating 
infringement suits with the same patents but different defendants. See Robert A. 
Matthews, Jr., 6 ANNOTATED PATENT DIGEST § 39:128 (2017) (“Where the same 
patent is asserted in multiple infringement actions, issues of validity of the patent 
and discovery from the inventors are generally common to each action regardless of 
the defendant. Hence, where the same patent is at issue, consolidation, of at least 
pretrial matters, often will be appropriate.”). 
121 See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
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entire industry adopts standardized technology122 or when the technology of 
one producer is incorporated into downstream goods and services of many 
end users.123 When this is the case, the plaintiff need only establish the 
technical aspects of its infringement case once, and then may replicate this 
effort in each subsequent case. 
 An intermediary with a model focused on capturing litigation 
avoidance payments may provide patent holders with royalty payments just 
the same as other intermediaries. However, the resulting license transactions 
do not confer the same benefits to prospective licensees as licenses that 
reflect the negotiated value of extinguishing the patent holder’s entitlement. 
Such intermediaries do not create value by helping parties overcome 
transaction costs preventing licensing transactions, but rather monetize the 
transaction costs themselves. 
IV. PATENT INTERMEDIARIES AND COMPETITION IN 
TECHNOLOGY MARKETS 
 When they acquire patents from multiple sources, patent 
intermediaries can influence technology market competition between patent 
holders. In the absence of an intermediary, the patent holders would 
compete with each other to license their patents to prospective licensees. 
When licensing through a common intermediary, however, the intermediary 
may coordinate their licensing practices, possibly distorting market 
competition between technologies.124 
 When a patent intermediary operates as a platform bringing 
together patent holders and prospective licensees, its licensing model bears 
many similarities to the models employed by other licensing intermediaries 
including performing rights organizations (PROs) such as ASCAP and 
BMI, patent pools such as MPEG LA, and patent exchanges such as IPXI 
                                                     
122 See Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear Inc., 620 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (finding 
that reliance upon an industry standard to prove infringement of products that 
indisputably satisfy the standard “can alleviate the need for highly technical fact-
finding such as the review of complicated source code”). 
123 See Tegic Commc’ns Corp. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Tex. Sys., 458 
F.3d 1335, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting that the customer suit exception, which 
gives preferential treatment to a manufacture’s action to resolve infringement 
charges against its customers, promotes “efficiency and judicial economy”). 
124 Similarly, a defensive aggregator may raise concerns if its members either 
collectively refuse  to deal with patent holders or otherwise exercise group buying 
power. For example, in Cascades Computer Innovation LLC v. RPX Corp., the 
Northern District of California credited a claim that the downstream licensees of a 
defensive aggregator collectively refused to deal with a patent owner outside of the 
offer made through the platform. See Cascades Comput. Innovation LLC v. RPX 
Corp., No. 12-CV-01143, 2013 WL 316023, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2013). 
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Holdings. Although the intermediaries vary in how rights are packaged and 
royalties distributed, each employs a fundamentally similar model based 
upon acquiring the rights to license intellectual property, granting non-
exclusive licenses to downstream users, and subsequently distributing the 
royalties back to the rights holders.  
 Performing rights organizations such as ASCAP and BMI arose in 
the early twentieth century as clearinghouses for copyright holders to 
license their copyrighted works for public performance.125 The PROs 
acquire the rights to sublicense their works from copyright holders, then 
grant licenses to prospective licensees and distribute the royalties back to 
the copyright holders.126 In many cases, this is done through the issuance of 
blanket licenses covering all of the PROs’ rights available for license.127 
 Similarly, patent pools are often created by a group of patent 
holders that decide to collectively license their respective patents to each 
other and to third parties.128  Frequently, the pools are created as 
independent firms which manage licensing and the distribution of royalties 
to their members. The patent holders will often either assign their patents to 
the pool outright or grant it a license with the right to sublicense to 
prospective licensees.129 
 In addition, IPXI Holdings, LLC (IPXI) was a financial exchange 
designed to facilitate patent licensing based upon “market-based 
principles.”130 The exchange traded in “unit license rights” that served as 
licenses to specific patents in its inventories.131 To create these rights, IPXI 
would acquire exclusive licenses form patent holders.132 It would then grant 
                                                     
125 See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1979). 
126 Id. at 5. 
127 Id.  
128 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 
(2007) [hereinafter 2007 DOJ & FTC REPORT].  
129 2017 GUIDELINES, supra note 96, at 32 (considering, in Example 9, two 
“manufacturers [who] assign several of their patents to a separate corporation 
wholly owned by the two firms”); Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability 
Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. 
REV. 1293, 1340 (1996) (“In a patent pool, multiple patent holders assign or license 
their individual rights to a central entity, which in turn exploits the collective rights 
by licensing, manufacturing, or both.”).  
130 See Letter from William J. Baer, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, to Garrard R. Beeny, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP 1 (Mar. 26, 2013) 
[hereinafter IPXI Letter]. 
131 Id. at 2. 
132 Id. at 1–2. 
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non-exclusive licenses to prospective licensees through the unit license 
rights.133 
 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department of Justice 
(DOJ) have expressed that many licensing platforms can promote efficient 
licensing of intellectual property. The FTC and DOJ guidance on patent 
pools, for example, states that pools may “create substantial transaction 
efficiencies” and “reduce the transaction costs of multiple licensing 
negotiations.”134  The DOJ has similarly asserted that “performing rights 
societies are … valuable in reducing the costs that would be associated with 
multiple transactions and with enforcement,” and that, absent the platform, 
the costs of “negotiating a license would exceed the value.”135 The DOJ also 
explained that the IPXI exchange “has the potential to facilitate more 
efficient licensing” by “obviating the need for costly bilateral negotiations” 
and “reducing the time and expense of acquiring and disseminating all the 
pooled patents to potential licensees…”136 
 Nevertheless, the agencies have articulated concerns regarding the 
distortive effect of platforms on competition between licensors. Rather than 
competing with one another for the inclusion of their intellectual property in 
downstream products, rights holders may coordinate their licensing through 
the platform. As such, these platforms can be used as vehicles for collusion 
between rival licensors.137 The effect on competition has raised concerns 
when the rights holder enters into an exclusive licensing arrangement with 
the platform and when the platform licenses substitute patents.  
 When platforms enter into exclusive arrangements with rights 
holders they can prevent them from licensing their rights outside of the 
platform. Thus, the only way that their licenses are available to prospective 
licensees is through the platform. In such a situation, prospective licensees 
who do not agree to the terms offered by the platform have no alternative 
means of acquiring a license.138 A patent intermediary may enter into a 
number of types of exclusive agreements with patent holders that provide 
the patent holder with an interest in their revenues.139  If a platform acquired 
patents pursuant to a revenue sharing agreement, for example, the prior 
patent holder would no longer be able to license the patents on its own 
                                                     
133 Id. at 2. 
134 2007 DOJ & FTC REPORT, supra note 128, at 57. 
135 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 20–21, Broad. Music, Inc. v. 
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, (1979) (No. 77-1578). 
136 IPXI Letter, supra note 130, at 6–7. 
137 See  2017 GUIDELINES, supra note 96, at 30. 
138 2007 DOJ & FTC REPORT, supra note 128, at 79–80.   
139 Similar arrangements may also exist between the downstream licensees of a 
defensive aggregator and the platform. See Cascades Comput. Innovation LLC v. 
RPX Corp., No. 12-CV-01143, 2013 WL 316023, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2013).  
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although that patent holder would retain an economic interest in the 
platform’s licensing activity. Although patent acquisition agreements are 
vertical in nature, they may have an impact on horizontal competition 
between patent holders if multiple patent holders enter into exclusive 
arrangements with the same platform.140   
 Antitrust authorities have raised concerns regarding exclusive 
licensor relationships in a number of licensing platform contexts and have 
found that allowing the licensor to license independently of the platform can 
sometimes ameliorate many of the competitive concerns. The DOJ has 
entered into consent agreements with both ASCAP and BMI requiring the 
PROs to allow rights holders to license independently of the platform.141 
The FTC challenged the conduct of the Summit-VISX pool, in part, because 
each member had the right to prevent the other member from licensing its 
patents outside of the pool.142 In the IPXI review letter, the DOJ observed 
that “having the option to license independently of a pool can mitigate the 
effects of potential market power.”143 Similarly, the FTC and DOJ offered 
guidance in the patent pool context that “allowing independent licensing 
outside the pool … permits innovators … to compete with the pool.”144 
 The FTC and DOJ have also raised concerns when platforms that 
do not permit independent licensing by rights holders require licensees to 
take portfolio licenses. The DOJ has entered into consent decrees with both 
                                                     
140 The 2017 Guidelines explained that vertical arrangements “may harm 
competition among entities in a horizontal relationship at either the level of the 
licensor or the licensees,” including if the restraint “facilitates coordination among 
entities in a horizontal relationship to raise prices or reduce output.” 2017 
GUIDELINES, supra note 96, at 20. Considering copyright holders’ relationship with 
the SESAC licensing agent, the Southern District of New York observed that, 
although such agreements were “fairly classified” as vertical, they “can also fairly 
be viewed as [a form of agreement among] potential competitors in the licensing of 
the rights to the same works” with a “significant horizontal dimension, alongside a 
vertical one.” Meredith Corp. v. SESAC LLC, 1 F. Supp. 3d 180, 205–06 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014). Similarly, the Northern District of California has allowed a claim 
that the agreements between a defensive aggregator and its licensees were vertical 
elements of a hub-and-spoke conspiracy to survive a motion to dismiss. Cascades 
Comput. Innovation, 2013 WL 316023, at *10. 
141 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 135, at 3–5. 
142 See Fed. Trade Comm’n, Analysis of Proposed Consent Order To Aid Public 
Comment, In the Matter of Summit Technology, Inc. and VISX, Inc. 2 (1998). 
143 IPXI Letter, supra note 130, at 9–10. IPXI proposed to obtain exclusive licenses 
from patent holders. Id. Although IPXI proposed to offer individual patents for a la 
carte licenses, the DOJ questioned whether the arrangement would provide 
incentives for any patent holder to agree to such a license. Id. at 10. See also 
Meredith Corp., 1 F. Supp. 3d at 214 (noting evidence that a PRO offered “no 
economically feasible” option to license rights independently).  
144 2007 DOJ & FTC REPORT, supra note 128, at 80.  
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ASCAP and BMI which require them to allow rights holders to 
independently license their works as a condition for the PROs granting of 
blanket licenses.145  The DOJ and FTC noted that a patent pool’s “refusal to 
license less than all of [its] intellectual property will not raise competitive 
concerns, provided that the licensors retain the ability to license their 
patents individually…”146 Without such a safeguard, licensees may be 
“required to purchase access to more technology than they need.”147  
 The FTC and DOJ have also expressed concern when licensing 
platforms license substitute patents.148 Substitute patents cover technologies 
that compete with each other and that implementers would choose between, 
in contrast to complimentary patents that cover technologies that perform 
different functions and that would be used together to produce the licensed 
product.149 Because substitute patents cover competing technologies, jointly 
licensing substitute patents could diminish competition between the 
technologies.150 
  When patent holders own substitute patents, their use of a common 
licensing platform could serve as a means of facilitating collusion. The FTC 
and DOJ have warned that the joint marketing of patent rights can present 
the opportunity for collective price setting or other anticompetitive 
coordinated licensing practices.151 Even if an intermediary acquires and 
licenses patents from different patent owners separately, the use of a 
common intermediary could diminish competition between the patent 
holders who would have licensed their patents unilaterally absent the 
intermediary.  
 The DOJ’s guidance regarding the IPXI exchange is instructive. 
The DOJ raised concerns with the potential for the exchange to serve as a 
licensing agent on behalf of holders of competitive patents.152 The DOJ 
observed that the exchange could use its role setting licensing terms to set 
accommodating terms for competing licensors.153 The DOJ noted that 
because the exchange and the patent holder shared in licensing revenue, 
both stood to profit from reducing competition between competing 
                                                     
145 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 135, at 3–5.  
146 2007 DOJ & FTC REPORT, supra note 128, at 84. 
147 Id. 
148 See, e.g., id. at 76–77. 
149 Id. at 77. 
150 See id. at 77; IPXI Letter, supra note 130, at 8. For example, when evaluating 
patent pooling arrangements, the FTC and DOJ consider the extent to which the 
patents licensed by the pool are substitutes for this reason. 2007 DOJ & FTC 
REPORT, supra note128, at 77. 
151 See id. at 28. 
152 IPXI Letter, supra note 130, at 11. 
153 Id. 
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patents.154 In addition, the DOJ noted that the exchange could facilitate the 
exchange of information related to license terms and price between different 
patent holders.155  
 The same principles of competition analysis that inform the analysis 
of other licensing intermediaries should be applicable to patent licensing 
intermediaries. Some patent intermediaries may operate as platforms 
connecting multiple patent holders with prospective licensees. While doing 
so may facilitate market liquidity, it also runs the risk of diminishing 
competition between firms that would otherwise be rival patent licensors. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 The Federal Trade Commission’s Report on its study of Patent 
Assertion Entity Activity provides novel detail regarding the interactions 
entities have with patent holders and with prospective licensees. In so doing 
it provides a glimpse of the types of transactions that occur in the 
contemporary patent marketplace. Its observations should foster continued 
analysis of the role that intermediaries play. 
 For example, the 2016 Report’s description of the practices of 
entities using a Litigation business model illustrates a demand for their 
services among patent holders. Litigation entities tended to trade in 
relatively small patent portfolios comprising less than ten—and frequently 
fewer than five patents.156  Prior literature suggests that transactions in such 
small portfolios are the ones most hindered by the transaction costs of 
licensing.157 To the extent that intermediaries may overcome these costs to 
increase liquidity in small patent portfolios, they may open technology 
markets to a broader range of patent licensors.  
 This paper argues that intermediaries acquiring patents through 
revenue sharing agreements and licensing them non-exclusively may be 
able to be analyzed as platforms capitalizing upon network effects to 
overcome the transaction costs of licensing. However, the paper also 
                                                     
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 11–12. 
156 See 2016 FTC REPORT, supra note 27, at 83 (“[M]ore than 75% of Litigation 
PAE licenses included between one and five patents, and more than 90% included 
fewer than ten patents.”). 
157 Hagiu and Yoffie observe that these inefficiencies may lead to a technology 
market that is predominated by transactions involving many patents between large 
companies and where transactions involving small inventors are rare. Hagiu & 
Yoffie, supra note 3, at 45, 47 (noting the impact of complementarities and 
portfolio effects in patent transactions). Hagiu and Yoffie also note that patent 
value is subject to strong portfolio effects such that the value of an individual patent 
is disproportionally lower than the value of a patent in a portfolio of 
complementary patents. Id. 
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acknowledges that some intermediaries may engage in superficially similar 
conduct that captures litigation avoidance payments and does not generate 
value for licensees. One manner in which the two models are distinguished 
is by how licenses are valued. The value to a licensee of a non-exclusive 
license includes both reducing uncertainty regarding potential liability and 
avoiding litigation costs. When the desire to avoid litigation costs is the 
predominant component of license value, an intermediary’s conduct may be 
consistent with rent-seeking behavior. Although the 2016 Report concludes 
that the entities practicing the Litigation business model appeared to obtain 
revenues consistent with the settlement of nuisance litigation, theory 
suggests that other intermediaries could facilitate licensing based upon the 
value of the patent holders’ entitlements.158 
 As this example shows, principles of competition should continue 
to inform the analysis of intermediaries and their role in technology 
markets. For example, from the perspective of a patent holder, an 
intermediary that provides a royalty stream obtained from litigation 
avoidance settlements may be indistinguishable from one that provides a 
royalty reflecting the value licensees derive from its patents. In effect, both 
intermediaries may agree to acquire small portfolios and offer comparable 
revenue sharing in consideration. Nevertheless, the intermediary providing a 
value-based royalty approach may provide prospective licensees with 
greater value relative to the royalties that they pay. Ultimately, competition 
between intermediaries to provide the greatest returns to the patent holder 
would determine which model is successful. Models based upon capturing 
litigation avoidance payments may be more attractive if manufacturers 
perceive their risk-adjusted royalty payments as low.  
 Similarly, principles of competition should continue to inform the 
analysis of how intermediaries influence competition between patent 
holders. For example, the 2016 Report observed that some patent assertion 
entities made use of multiple affiliates to license patents from multiple 
patent holders, with each affiliate separately licensing patents acquired from 
a single patent holder.159 Others licensed large patent portfolios aggregated 
                                                     
158 See 2016 FTC REPORT, supra note 27, at 43 (“[T]he behavior of Litigation PAEs 
is consistent with nuisance litigation.”). 
159 See id. at 48 (“Litigation PAEs typically conducted business in the following 
manner. First, the Litigation PAE established an Affiliate . . . . After creating an 
Affiliate, a Litigation PAE would generally acquire a small portfolio of patents . . . . 
The Affiliate would hold only the small portfolio of patents acquired by the 
Litigation PAE in that single transaction. Litigation PAEs did not aggregate patents 
acquired through multiple transactions into individual Affiliates.”), 84 (“When 
Responding PAEs had multiple Affiliates, typically an Affiliate—and not the 
Responding PAE—held the patents in question and entered into the patent license 
with the licensee. Most often, the license was therefore only between that Affiliate 
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from multiple patent holders.160 In both cases, the entities operated as an 
alternative to the multiple patent holders each licensing their patents 
independently. When evaluating the competitive impact of patent 
intermediary behavior, the impact of such joint licensing conduct on 
technology market competition should be taken into account. 
                                                                                                                       
patent holder and the licensee and extended only to patents held by the Affiliate . . . 
.”), 51 (“Larger Litigation PAEs also used the Affiliate model, scaling up by 
creating more Affiliates to hold portfolios as they were acquired, instead of 
aggregating patents into larger portfolios. This structure may reflect how Litigation 
PAEs paid for the patents they acquired. As noted already, Litigation PAEs 
frequently entered into revenue sharing agreements with patent sellers, agreeing to 
pay the sellers a percentage of the revenues that the PAE would obtain through 
licensing as consideration for the patents. The use of separate LLCs to own and 
assert patents acquired from separate sellers would make it easier for PAEs to 
segregate revenue for sharing with each patent seller.”). 
160 See id. at 46 (“Other Portfolio PAEs acquired smaller numbers of patents per 
transaction and aggregated them into larger portfolios. . . . Portfolio PAEs then 
organized acquired patents into one or more portfolios . . . and offered these 
portfolios for licensing.”). 
